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TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND PUBLIC WORKS, JUNE 27, 1995
FRANK L MICHELMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
I am here to testify about the bearing of the Constitution, and
particularly the Fifth Amendment's requirement ofjust compensation for
takings of private property for public use, on proposed "property rights"
legislation. Such legislation would require payments of money to
property owners to offset market-value reductions attributable to certain
kinds of federal regulatory restrictions on use,1 regardless of whether a
court acting on the basis of the Amendment would require any such
payment.
The bottom line of my testimony is that the case for legislation of
this kind rests on a mistakenly oversimplified, a mistakenly purist, view
of the place of private property rights, basic and important as those
certainly are, in our full constitutional scheme. The legislation's premise
is that the freedom of owners to do with their property whatever they
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard Law School.
1. Under the pending Senate bill, some state-imposed restrictions might also be
affected insofar as the impetus for them came from federal law or their imposition was
supported with federal funds. S. 605, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 203(6), 204(a) (1995)
[hereinafter S. 605]. Section 204(b) of the bill apparently precludes suits for statutory
compensation against states or state agencies.
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choose (short of the sort of direct or gross interference with specifically
identified other people or their property that makes one a nuisance at
common law) takes a clear precedence over the role and responsibility
of government, through its law-making authority, to identify and
appropriately defend important other interests of individuals and the
public. Such private-property absolutism is, however, contrary to historic
American constitutional understanding; and without the absolutist
premise to support them, "property rights" laws themselves lack any
robust public justification. Avoiding grossly unfair distributions of
regulatory burdens among our citizens is indeed a highly worthy goal,
but "property rights" legislation is not a good way to pursue that goal.
II. FRAMING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The leading current proposals in the Senate for statutory compensa-
tion for use-restrictions are found in Titles II and V of Senate Bill 605,
the proposed Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995.2 Let us look first
at Title V. Section 508 would create an entitlement to be paid for
diminutions of one third or more in the market value of a parcel of land,
or of any "affected portion" of a parcel, as a consequence of use
restrictions imposed under either the Endangered Species Act or
section 404 (a wetlands provision) of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act,3 unless the Government could establish that the restricted use was
already a legally actionable nuisance as "commonly understood" within
the applicable state background or common law.4 The Title V compensa-
tion provision would thus be oddly limited and selective: Its protections
would extend only to landowners, as distinct from property owners
generally,5 and indeed the protections would extend only to certain
landowners-those whose uses are restricted by agency action under the
two specifically named federal statutes.
Title II of Senate Bill 605 is much more sweepingly drafted. As
does Title V, Title II apparently contains a compensation entitlement for
2. S. 605 was introduced on the floor of the Senate by Majority Leader Bob Dole. See
141 CONG. REc. S4497 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995).
3. See S. 605, supra note 1, §§ 502(2), 502(6), 508(a). To be precise, the bill speaks
of market-value diminutions of 33 per cent or more. Id. § 508(a).
4. Id. § 204(d).
5. Id. § 502(4)(A) (defining a protected "private property owner" as an owner or
holder of "property"), and § 502(5) (defining "property" as "(A) land; (B) any interest in
land; and (C) the right to use or the right to receive water").
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those who sustain reductions of one third or more in the market values
of "affected portions" of property resulting from federal-law restrictions
of uses not demonstrably common-law nuisances. By marked contrast
with Title V, however, the Title II compensation provision apparently
would reach actions pursuant to any federal statute (not just two named
ones), and apparently would cover all property to which the Fifth
Amendment might under any circumstances apply.7 This means,
specifically, not just land and water rights, but fixtures and improvements
to land, easements, leases, liens, future interests, rents, contract rights,
and, indeed "any interest defined as property under State law; or ...
understood to be property based on custom, usage, common law, or
mutually reinforcing understandings sufficiently well-grounded in law to
back a claim of interest."8  This expression, of course, potentially
encompasses sundry interests in all forms of personal property (tangible
goods, securities, intellectual property, commercial contract rights, and
other intangibles) as well as real property (land and various claims
related to land). Senate Bill 605 as currently drafted does not make clear
the intended relationship between Titles II and V. For purposes of my
testimony, it will be most helpful to treat the compensation provisions in
the two Titles--sections 204 and 508 and their respective surrounding
definitional materials-as alternative proposals, one grandly sweeping in
its coverage and the other narrowly selective.
My topic, as I have said, is how constitutional considerations bear
upon appraisals of the merits and demerits of these proposals. Let me
make clear at the outset, though, that I do not at any point mean to
suggest that there is ground for concern that a court would deny the
constitutionality of either compensation provision-Title II's or Title
V's-if enacted into law. Measures aimed at equitable provision for
those who otherwise would sustain special and unfair burdens as a result
of the government's pursuit of its constitutionally granted functions
undoubtedly fall within the power expressly granted to Congress by the
Necessary and Proper Clause,9 as well as within the implied supporting
6. See id. §§ 203(7), 204(a)(2)(D). The intended meaning of these provisions is not,
however, entirely clear to this reader. See infra note 28.
7. See S. 605, supra note 1, §§ 203(7), 204(a)(2)(E).
8. Id. §§ 203(5)(e)-(f).
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
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powers confirmed by the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland."0
Of course, the (substantive) due process and (implied) equal protection
requirements of the Fifth Amendment would still apply. Our courts,
however, would classify these Titles as economic and social legislation
which need only pass a "rational basis" test, or "loose scrutiny," in order
to satisfy these requirements. Although, as we shall see, the highly
selective character of Title V's compensation provision can be strongly
criticized as arbitrary, inequitable, and unprincipled, existing precedent
strongly indicates that the courts would defer to congressional judgments
about how to draw the line between those who will and those who will
not receive the benefits of ostensibly remedial legislation."
In sum, I have no doubt that Senate Bill 605's compensation
provisions would pass constitutional muster in the courts. But if so, one
might well ask, what further attention is required from those considering
the bill's merits to constitutional conceptions of property rights and their
due protection against infringement? The answer is that the very
question of the bill's merits-the very need to explain what genuine
public purpose would be served by transferring funds taxed away from
the public at large to certain private owners of property-is closely
bound up with the question of how our Constitution has historically been
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). If the legislation were to authorize federal
compensation suits against states or their agencies, a question of constitutional federalism
might arise. See supra note 1. Specifically, in order to find sufficient constitutional
authorization for such a direct intrusion into state-government affairs, Congress might have
to look to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants it authority to enforce
the rights created in section one of the Amendment including, of course, the right not to
be deprived by any state of property without due process of law (which the Supreme Court
has construed as including the right not to have private property taken by a state for public
use without payment ofjust compensation). Because the drafters of the bill apparently do
not intend to create any federal remedy against states or their agencies, I have not here
tried to analyze the constitutional-legal issues that might otherwise arise respecting section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment, although my discussion below of the Lucas case
should begin to suggest the potential complexity of these issues.
Section 204(a) of S. 605 does direct against state as well as federal agencies its
prohibition of uncompensated, excessive, regulatory diminution of the market values of
affected portions of property. Yet section 204(b) apparently (if puzzlingly) precludes a
federal cause of action against noncomplying state agencies. Perhaps the intention, which
does not seem to be made explicit anywhere in the bill as currently drafted, is that a claim
for compensation will lie against the federal agencies respectively responsible for
administering the federal laws that propel or support the offending state agency actions,
11. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980)
(upholding a statute that "arbitrarily" granted a windfall to current "connected" railroad
employees under a "reasonable bais" test).
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understood to command both a due regard for private property and a due
regard for representative government's capacity for vigorous pursuit of
environmental and other public interests. This point, which is crucial to
my testimony, requires some explanation.
Property rights laws are meant to respond to claims of "regulatory
taking," that is, claims by owners that legal restrictions on the use of
their property are tantamount to takings for public use for which the Fifth
Amendment requires a compensation payment. We have to start, then,
by asking about the judicial response to such claims. While varying over
time in the details, the Supreme Court's response has always been that
the Constitution only rarely and exceptionally requires compensation for
regulatory use-restrictions, even ones having very substantial effects on
market values, as long as the restrictions do not directly impose or
conditionally demand any actual entry on private property-any
"physical occupation" of it-by the government or the public. 2 Under
this time-honored judicial view, imaginable regulatory-taking claims
have, for the most part, been legally hopeless. Prospects in some cases
might vary somewhat depending on which state or federal lower court
you go to, but under the Supreme Court's historic multi-factor balancing
test, claims of taking-by-regulation undoubtedly face what lawyers and
judges have widely recognized as an uphill fight.
Against such a background, enactment of the compensation
provisions of Senate Bill 605 would plainly confer a very nice benefit on
whatever segment of property owners would obtain the provisions'
protections. (Under Title V this would be a very narrow segment, that
is, owners who are burdened by endangered-species and certain wetlands
restrictions.) That benefit, of course, would be the prospect of the
money the new law would sometimes send to these owners, in circum-
stances where courts applying the Constitution alone would have allowed
them nothing.
The bill, then, is precisely aimed at granting certain property owners
anti-regulatory protections in excess of those allowed them by courts
applying the Constitution. It aims to accomplish this result by setting a
sharp and categorical line of compensability, so that whenever that line
is crossed-whenever a use restriction reduces by one third or more the
12. For recent judicial discussions, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 112
S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (Scalia, J.); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (O'Connor,
J.) (holding that a scheme of rent controls combined with restrictions against eviction of
tenants is not a taking). Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion is further considered below.
1996]
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market value of any "portion" of a parcel of property-compensation
would be legally due regardless of whether a court in that case would
have concluded that the unbolstered Constitution required any compensa-
tion at all. 3
13. According to current judicial doctrine, cases in which the Constitution does not
itself call for any compensation payment include many in which regulatory restrictions on
uses-uses that very likely do not amount to common-law nuisances-reduce market
values of entire landholdings by fractions in excess of one third. See the discussion of the
Lucas case, infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. Enactment of either Title II or Title
V of S. 605 would substantially change this result.
Indeed, if either Title were to be enacted in something similar to its current form, the
effect could be extreme. Title V defines protected property as including both "land" and
"any interest in land." S. 605, supra note 1, § 502(5). Title II contains the most sweeping
definition of protected property imaginable, including "inchoate interests," "easements,"
"security interests," "rents, issues, and profits," "any interest defined as property under
State law," and "any interest understood to be property based on custom, usage, common
law, or mutually reinforcing understandings sufficiently well-grounded in law to back a
claim of interest." Id. § 203(5). By making a sufficiently aggressive use of these
definitions, any application whatsoever of any sort of land regulation could easily be held
compensable, regardless of how marginal its effect on the market value of a landholding
taken as a whole, on the theory that it totally devalues a conceptually severed "portion"
of property or "interest" in it that common-law usage and lawyers' customary talk
identifies as a servitude or negative easement. On conceptual severance, see Margaret J.
Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676-78 (1988).
Such an extreme result would run against the grain of the Supreme Court's understand-
ing. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-98
(1987) (rejecting claim of total taking of certain identifiable tons of coal, required by anti-
subsidence law to be left unmined, because the regulation's proportional effect should be
measured against the value of the claimant's entire "mining operation'); Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ("[W]here an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights,
the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must
be viewed in its entirety."); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978) (rejecting claim that prohibition of building in airspace above existing structure
totally took the claimant's "air rights," because "'[taking' jurisprudence does not divide
a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated").
For the current Supreme Court, the question is still open of how to define "the 'property
interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured" in order to determine whether
that loss is total. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7
(1992) (Scalia, J.). Taken in light of the prior decisions, which Justice Scalia's discussion
reviews, the Justice's tentative suggestion there-that "the answer may lie in how the
owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property"-does
not portend the simplistic view (which Title II of S. 605 as drafted could be taken to
imply) that every regulatory restriction on property use effects a total, hence compensable
taking of whatever conceptually severed "portion" or "interest" is affected by the
regulation.
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To many who take a skeptical view of property rights legislation, it
seems that to require in this way the handing over of public funds to
private owners whose activities are restricted by otherwise valid laws,
when that is not required by the Constitution's own standard offairness
as judicially ascertained, is tantamount to giving away public money for
no good public reason. The skeptics thus raise the most basic "merits"
question one can ask about a piece of legislation: What is the supposed
public justification for this conferral of monetary benefits at taxpayer
expense on a statutorily defined (under Title V it would be an extremely
narrowly and selectively defined) subset of citizens?
To this question, the strongest sort of answer would apparently be
the kind that supporters of property rights legislation tend to give.
Supporters say this legislative supplementation of judicial efforts to
enforce the government's constitutional compensation obligations is
required and justified by respect for private property rights, rights which
they say courts for some reason-perhaps some institutional or structural
reason pertaining more to limits on judicial role and capacity than to true
constitutional meaning-have failed to give full protection. 4 Support-
ers maintain that these judicially under-protected rights are nevertheless
legal rights for which the Constitution really does in principle demand
absolute protection, 5 and furthermore are moral rights whose absolute
protection is demanded by principles at the root of American
constitutionalism.
It must be said that this high-principle explanation of the public
purpose to be served by the compensation provisions of Senate Bill 605
rings hollow as applied to Title V in its current form. It is hard to see
how a law in defense of such exigent moral principles and constitutional
rights with respect to private property could possibly confine its
protections to that particular subset of landowners who chafe under two
selected statutes. This question of selectivity in drafting is one to which
I will return later. First, however, I want to consider in a more general
way the force of the property rights explanation of the proposed
compensation provisions' public purpose: that these provisions serve the
14. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 54497 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole). According to Title I of S. 605, the bill's purpose is to "encourage, support, and
promote the private ownership of property" and ensure "the constitutional and legal
protection" thereof. S. 605, supra note 1, § 102.
15. That is, in the form of compensation for every infringement beyond what is
already contained in common-law nuisance doctrine.
1996]
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purpose of aiding the courts in the defense of constitutional and moral
rights associated with private property to which our system is historically
committed.
This explanation of the bill's public purpose might be a very strong
one. It might be, but only if its supporting historical premise were as a
matter of fact substantially true for the United States. That premise
posits an overriding constitutional and moral commitment in this country
to a level and sweep of proprietary freedom that decidedly outranks and
subordinates the responsibilities of public government. If the premise is
incorrect, then it is very hard to discern any persuasive public purpose
at all for Senate Bill 605's compensation provisions.' 6 The burden of my
testimony is that the premise is not, in fact, correct. The correct premise,
I suggest, is the one faithfully reflected by the Supreme Court's sustained
refusal over the decades to open wide the gates to regulatory taking
claims. This consistent stance has not been a result of some quirky
judicial inability to go ahead and defend private property to the hilt as
the American social contract requires. To the contrary, it has been the
entirely appropriate result of the Court's accurate perception that the
American social contract-what Justice Scalia has called "the historical
compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our
constitutional culture""--decidedly does not require such a to-the-hilt
16. It may be that an anticipated, perhaps a desired, practical consequence of
enactment of these provisions would be sharply reduced regulatory activity under certain
federal statutes. But if such an expected deregulatory consequence is the true aim of S.
605's compensation provisions, then direct repeal or amendment of the regulatory laws in
question is obviously the more straightforward, responsible, and accountable way to pursue
that aim.
Some may argue that requiring agencies to cover the private costs of their regulatory
actions out of their appropriations will be conducive to agencies making economically
rational regulatory choices. That argument, however, is very frail. In general, it overlooks
the problem of inefficiencies of private overinvestment in uses destined for regulatory
restriction. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis ofLegal Transitions, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 509 (1986). Even disregarding that objection, the argument in this context is
especially ill-considered. Senate Bill 605's most directly predictable effect on budget-
conscious agencies must be to bias their selection of cases for regulatory enforcement
against those in which enforcement might make a one-third-or-more difference in the
market value of some "portion" of a private property holding. But there is no a priori
reason to believe that these cases will tend to be ones where enforcement would produce
relatively low (or negative) surpluses of total (public-plus-private) benefit over total
(public-plus-private) costs. The opposite seems just as likely to be true. It follows that
S. 605's predictable effect on the economic rationality of agency enforcement choices can
be no better than random.
17. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2990.
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insulation of private property from public concerns, but rather requires
a much more sensitive mediation between two fundamental constitutional
principles: respect for private property, and respect for representative
government's responsibility to discern and secure important interests of
the commonwealth or of the public considered as a whole.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: "REGULATORY TAKING" IN
FULL CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
That some disproportionately severe and unforeseeable regulatory
restrictions on property use would excite concerns about rights to
compensation is entirely understandable and appropriate. As a starting
point for analysis, however, we should note that treating use restrictions
as compensable takings was no part of what the Framers of the Fifth
Amendment had in mind. As Justice Scalia has written, "early constitu-
tional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations
of property at all."' 8 Nor does a literal reading of the clause--"nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion"-provide much support for the idea of taking-by-regulation, given
that it is obviously something of a stretch to say that the government
"takes" your land "for public use" when what the government precisely
does is forbid you certain uses of land (as opposed to granting itself or
anyone else any use of it) to which you continue to hold an exclusive
private title.
None of this means that taking-by-regulation is an insupportable
constitutional notion. It only means that the main basis for any such
notion is neither the literal meaning of the words of the clause nor the
Framers' original understanding. Rather, in entertaining the idea of a
taking-by-regulation, we are allowing broader moral and purposive
considerations to enter into our determinations of the Constitution's legal
meaning. A "regulatory taking" claim is, after all, a claim that a certain
governmentally imposed restriction on the use of property ought, in all
constitutional reason, to trigger a governmental duty to compensate.
The Supreme Court has not been closed to such claims, but it has
found American constitutional reason to be sufficiently complex to
preclude anything even approaching blanket acceptance of them. The
best short way to convey this judicial understanding is to recall some
crucial passages from Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in the 1992
18. Id.at2900n.15.
19961
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case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 9 Briefly, the
background is this: As noted above, under the Court's pre-Lucas multi-
factor balancing test,2" regulatory-taking claimants could only hope to
succeed in a few, rare instances. The Lucas decision somewhat
strengthens the prospects of some future claimants by modifying the
previous test in one particular: It adds a categorical presumptive rule
requiring compensation in those cases, which Justice Scalia took pains
to point out would be "relatively rare," in which a use-restriction denies
all economically beneficial or productive use of a parcel of land and the
restricted use is not already a nuisance under preexisting state law."
An obvious question is: Why should the Court have thus drawn the
line of presumptive compensability at the seemingly arbitrary point of
total extinguishment of beneficial use of a landholding? Justice Scalia's
explanation of the Court's reasoning for doing so is important for our
purposes, because it is quite at odds with the underlying premise of the
proposed property rights legislation.
The Court's task in this context, Justice Scalia explained, is to keep
constitutional law in tune with the American public's deeply shared sense
of the basic proprieties of constitutional government in its dealings with
private property. Here are Justice Scalia's words explaining both the
judicial task and the relevant, entrenched American constitutional
understanding:
[O]ur "takings"jurisprudence. .. has traditionally been
guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the
content of, and the State's power over, the "bundle of
rights" that they acquire when they obtain title to proper-
ty. It seems to us that the property owner necessarily
expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time
to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State
19. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
20. The test takes into account the extent of the regulatory devaluation of the entire
property-holding in question, whether that devaluation destroys a distinct and justified
investment-backed expectation, and "the character of the government action"--whether it
involves an actual physical encroachment on the affected property and whether it demands
the claimant donate his property to production of a new public benefit, as opposed to
avoiding uses of the property that infringe harmfully on established public interests. See,
e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). As the
Court has repeatedly recognized, none of these factors is susceptible of precise definition
or mechanical application; all are somewhat roughly intuitive considerations whose exact
force is hard to specify outside the context of particular claims of regulatory unfairness.
21. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894, 2900.
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in legitimate exercise of its police powers; "[a]s long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to the police power."22
Justice Scalia's meaning is unmistakable: Thoughts of compensation are,
by the prevalent understanding of Americans, simply out of place in most
instances of regulatory restrictions on property use. The American way
has been to treat the bulk of these events as belonging to the normal
give-and-take of a progressive, dynamic, democratic society, an ordinary
part of the background of risk and opportunity against which we all take
our chances in our roles as investors in property, and from which we all
as actual or potential property investors also reciprocally benefit.' Now
Justice Scalia did, of course, have a bit more to say:
In the case of land, however, we think the notion.., that
title is somehow held subject to the "implied limitation"
that the State may subsequently eliminate all economical-
ly valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact
recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of
our constitutional culture. 24
In other words, the Court accepts a responsibility to deal with taking-of-
property claims in a way that is consonant with, and so will help sustain
public confidence in, what the opinion calls "the historical compact,"
meaning historic American commitments to respect for basic principles
of constitutional government, including, yet not limited to, the institution
of private property. From its observation and knowledge of the country's
actual constitutional culture, the Court draws the conclusion that there are
some regulatory takings claims-those that involve total extinguishment
22. Id. at 2899 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)
(Holmes, J.)).
23. At this point in American history, it is obvious that the market value of any
property holding is what it is because of prior and current governmental actions that could
not have occurred without this country's long-standing endorsement of the government's
ability to regulate property, beyond the common law of nuisance and without having to
pay for the privilege, except in rare and exceptional cases. It would thus be very arbitrary,
a step away from distributive fairness and not toward it, to entitle some members of the
current generation of property owners to compensation based on comparisons of their
holdings' respective market values before and after application of a particular regulatory
restriction to them. That approach disregards the market-value benefits accruing to every
current owner from the entire past and present system of government action. It exempts
the owners it benefits from compliance with the constitutional compact on which all
property market values depends.
24. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 (emphasis added).
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of a land parcel's economic value-that cannot be rejected without
contradicting the country's commitment to private property.
Thus the Lucas Court was moved by its knowledge that the
constitutional compact includes, as one of its terms, a commitment to
respect the institution of private property. The Court, however, was
equally moved by its knowledge that the compact also includes principles
and commitments that must limit and qualify private property in ways
that make the bulk of regulatory-takings claims unfit for resolution by
any kind of flat and sweeping categorical rule. Specifically-and here
I elaborate on what is plainly conveyed by Justice Scalia's circumspect
treatment of the regulatory-takings question--our constitutional culture
and compact include a deep and ancient tradition of expected regard for
other people's and the public's interest and concerns when you make use
of your property.' It includes a deep and ancient strain that says this
expectation of regard for public interest and concerns is subject, when
the occasion requires, to legislative definition and regulatory enforce-
ment.26 The tradition, in sum, is one of a law of property that is oriented
both to fair protection of private advantage and to due regard for
contemporary community goals, relying, in part, on the police powers of
legislatures, alongside common law adjudication by courts, to negotiate
and mediate between the two.
There are signs that the drafters of Title V have themselves sensed
the strength of the expectation of governance built into the historic
American understanding of rights of property. I have in mind the
ambivalence we have already noticed in Senate Bill 605, as introduced,
between an arbitrarily narrow and a sweepingly broad scope for the
proposed statutory guarantee of compensation for use restrictions. The
drafters confined Title V's coverage to two selected laws, but on what
principled basis did they do so? It is possible, of course, that this
selectivity just reflects particular anti-regulatory sentiments that have
little to do with any broad principle of protection for private property
rights as such. 7 But the drafters could have had a different reason for
25. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 9-36 (1985) (discussing colonial American conceptions of
liberty and property).
26. See, e.g., John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings
Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1 (1993) (discussing the Lucas case in the context of
historical Supreme Court jurisprudence).
27. To repeat: I am not here suggesting for a moment that a court ought to hold the
bill unconstitutional on this ground. I am suggesting that the specifically benefitted
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shrinking back from making Title V cover all property as affected by all
regulatory laws-that such a broadly drafted bill would run so hard
against the prevalent American understanding of the full constitutional
compact as to be politically unacceptable.
This takes us back to Title II of Senate Bill 605, as introduced.
Although the matter is not free from doubt, Title II can be read as calling
for compensation for market-value reductions of one third or more that
are attributable to any federal regulatory laws as applied to property
holdings of any kind.2" Let us suppose this is the correct reading. What
would be the real-world consequences? In palpable jeopardy, it seems,
would be not just two laws of uncertain popularity to which there is
strongly organized political opposition, but also the labor and workplace
laws, the anti-discrimination laws, the anti-trust and regulated-industry
laws, the banking and securities and trade-regulation laws, the food and
drug and labeling laws, and the air-pollution laws. All of these laws
have important applications to property uses that are not legal nuisances
under state common law, in ways that it would seem can often have a
substantial effect on the market values of property holdings.
constituencies here, owners of land burdened by the two regulatory programs picked out
by Title V of S. 605, compose an arbitrarily small subset of American property owners
whose holdings would be worth substantially more on the market if granted special relief
from federal regulatory restrictions of non-nuisance uses-so arbitrarily small as to shed
doubt on the idea that Title V is aimed at vindicating a broad, general, and exigent
constitutional and moral principle of private-property protection. This highly select group
of beneficiaries of public leniency--some of them, I am sure, exceptionally deserving of
the public's consideration, but not nearly all of them and surely not, as a group, any more
so than many who have been left out-seem something like the gerrymandered subset of
railroad retirees who were grandfathered into "dual benefits" by the legislation upheld
against constitutional objection in United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980).
28. See supra notes 6-8. Section 204(a)(2)(D) entitles an owner to compensation
whenever, "as a consequence of an action of any agency," private property is taken for
public use and, in addition, the action diminishes the fair market value of any portion of
property by one third or more. Section 203(2) defines "agency action" to include any
action by an agency that "adversely affects private property rights." Section 203(7)
defines "taking of private property" to include "any action whereby private property...
is taken so as to require compensation under.., this Act, including by ... regulation."
There is some undeniable circularity in this combination of provisions as they stand.
Nevertheless, a court could very well decide that their intent when taken all together is to
provide that an enforced regulatory restriction of property use is a statutorily compensable
event when it causes a diminution of one third or more in the market value of any portion
of any property.
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Take, for example, a case of property in the form of a manufactur-
ing plant and an owner who makes a credible case that the market value
of the property holding at this location would be enhanced by, say, forty
percent if all his activities at the site were relieved of either wage-and-
hour, workplace-safety, or collective-bargaining regulation.29 The
activities restricted by these classes of regulation do not resemble
common-law nuisances. Does our owner, then, collect compensation for
having to pay the minimum wage, or for having to introduce safety
routines or devices, or for having to bargain in good faith with a labor-
board certified union?
Would this conclusion be erroneous because these laws do not have
the effect of restricting the use, and thereby diminishing the market
value, of any discrete parcel of property-which is the obviously
intended concern of Title II? It does not seem so, because our owner can
always say: "Look, here is a particular right or interest in property I
used to have: piece-work shop, at a monthly labor cost of $X (here are
my books for the past year to prove it), as long as I could find folks
willing to work for that amount (which the evidence will show I still
can). May it please the court, my former right and property interest to
that effect no longer exists, now that the agency has cited me for
violating the wage law (or the safety law or the bargaining law)." "
Would the American public endorse, as consonant with their
constitutional compact, a law having such consequences as these? If you
carefully told the people that a bill carried implications as sweeping as
what I have just described, all the while assuring them that the bill did
29. Of course, it would take some serious economic analysis to show this, You would
have to know and show a lot about the competitive structure of the market in which the
manufacturer was selling. But, suppose he has unorganized competition, or competition
from abroad, so that being subjected to collective-bargaining or wage-and-hour or safety
regulation does, in fact, seriously reduce the net revenue stream he could otherwise expect
from his factory. The assumption is that he cannot raise prices to cover additional labor
costs without an unacceptable loss of market share, but also that his reduced net revenues
still remain his most economically favorable use for the property with its standing factory.
30. The example is easily extendible to the other classes of federal regulation I
mentioned above: anti-discrimination, antitrust and regulated industries, banking and
securities and trade regulation, food and drug and labeling, and air pollution. A
moderately able judge would have little trouble reaching and defending a conclusion (for
example) that a divestiture order in a monopolization case, or an order to cease and desist
from discriminatory pricing, or insufficient labeling of a product manufactured at or sold
from a particular location destroyed a previously existent right or interest in using certain
property in a certain way.
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so in the name of a higher-law mandate to respect property rights, would
the people understand? Agree? Approve? Or none of the above?
Would such a sweepingly drafted property-rights bill command the
requisite congressional majorities? Perhaps these questions answer
themselves. I believe they show what is deeply wrong with the central
premise-the absolutistic property-rights premise-underlying the
proposed legislation.
Drafters of property rights legislation confront a serious dilemma.
Earlier I suggested that confining the coverage of a property rights law
to use restrictions imposed under a few selected statutes shows that the
law is not really about property-rights protection at all, but rather is
about specific anti-regulation objectives. Just now, I have been trying to
suggest that the alternative-a broad-coverage bill that would display the
courage of its property-right convictions---carries diminutive implications
about the powers and responsibilities of government in our system that
Americans would not recognize as consonant with their full constitutional
compact. The ultimate lesson, I believe, is that the regulatory takings
issue cannot be responsibly handled at wholesale, with a simple statutory
formula. The problem is obstreperously, recalcitrantly multi-factorial and
contextual. It can only be handled at a more retail level, as courts have
done with the balancing test. The Lucas decision requires nothing
different except in the "relatively rare" case of a total extinguishment of
the economic value of a landholding.
I do not mean that only judicial case-by-case balancing will serve,
or that there is no room here for entirely appropriate congressional action
aimed at improving the fairness of the distribution of regulatory burdens.
I believe it would make a great deal of sense for Congress to take up
regulatory programs one by one, to try to find fair formulas for
compensability that are tailored to the various programs. But the case of
an owner of a family-sized building lot who unexpectedly discovers it to
be the last remaining habitat for an animal species is not the same,
morally or (broadly speaking) constitutionally, as the case of an investor
in thousands of forest acres who discovers some portion of the acreage
to be such a habitat, or the case of an investor (in our times) in
thousands of acres of river valley who "unexpectedly" discovers that
some of the land is a swamp, as defined by law (even a newly enacted
law). Congress ought not to pretend otherwise. Improved responsive-
ness to property rights will have to be responsive to such differences,
too, if it means to claim real resonance with the American historical
compact.
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